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Abstract 
The split of Sudan into two sovereign states, Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, in 
July 20 II did not come as a surprise to many interested parties to the Sudanese conflict. 
Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan have intensified their dispute over an oil rich 
border region of Abyei . This artic le looks at the history of another border dispute be-
tween Nigeria and Cameroun over Bakassi peninsula with the aim of identifying mistakes 
made by the two neighbors, Nigeria and Cameroun, in trying to resolve the dispute. Spe-
cifically, this study suggests paths Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan can follow to 
resolve their border dispute without committ ing the same mistakes made by Nigeria and 
Cameroun over Bakassi . 
Introduction 
The Republic of South Sudan proclaimed its independence on July 9, 20 II. On 
that day, the Republic of South Sudan became the 55u' independent state in Afri-
ca. As a sovereign nation state, it shares borders with Sudan, Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Some of 
these borders may be contentious because of the presence of scarce resources as 
in Abyei. Other border areas may remain peaceful because of existing better 
methods of resolving conflicts among neighbors like negotiations and accommo-
dation. Yet, there may be others that are strategically located but may not be 
contentious either because the actors in the area chose peace over confrontation 
or avoidance culture prevail in such areas. Border towns or areas are beautiful 
brides courted by many su itors not necessarily because of natural love for them 
but most often, as a result of what can be exploited from the brides. The story is 
the same from the Kashmir tripartite boundaries among China, India, and Paki-
stan to the Rock of Gibraltar's boundary between Spain and Morocco--as well as 
the Bakassi Peninsular which, until recently, was a source of tension between 
Cameroun and igeria. The people on the two sides of the Sudan divide have the 
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opportunity now to use the lessons of Bakassi to manage their conflict for a mu-
tual benefit as they transition from one sovereign state to two sovereign nations. 
Conflicts can be political, economic, social, and legal. None of these typolo-
gies can stand alone; rather, they are interlinked . For example, political conflict 
may lead to economic conflict as was the case of Nigeria where conflicts be-
tween the military ruling class and its civilian counterpart promoted the misuse of 
the economic windfalls from the first and second Gulf wars. Sim ilarly, the social 
disagreement between the secular minded sections of Afghanistan and the reli-
gious group (Taliban) is partly responsible for the political, economic, and legal 
woes of the country today. In the same vein, the Sudanese conflicts have often 
been written and explained as conflicts between the Muslim dominated North 
and the Christian and animist Southern Sudan. 
Bakassi peninsula is a border region between Nigeria and Cameroon (Kame-
run during Germany era, Cameroun when France occupied it, and Cameroon by 
the UK). The two countries claim sovereignty over the area fo r more than one 
reason. The first is the discovery of oil, a natural resource that can make a nation 
powerful in the international community. There are also positional and cultural 
conflicts among the two independent states given their shared colonial history 
and the ethnic groups that have lived there. The European powers that ruled the 
peninsula at various stages had their own conflicts over such natural resources as 
agriculture and trade. The purpose of this paper is to look at the history of the 
Bakassi peninsula and its conflicts with a view to identify ing some of the mis-
takes in them that need to be avoided in order to achieve success in Abyei. This 
paper fills the gap in the literature by identifying lessons that may be learned by 
Abyei from the Bakassi conflict. 
Review of Related Literature 
Concept of Natural Resource Conflicts 
Many writers such as Collier (2004) and Pankhurst (2003) have aptly established 
the link between natural resources and violent conflicts by stating that states and 
communities that depend on natural resources are more likely to be engaged in 
conflict. Abdalla (2006) is of the view that the conflicts between the Dinka Ngog 
and Misseriya ethnic groups that dominate the Abyei region are directly connect-
ed to its natural resources. He further opines that their survival is almost com-
pletely dependent on natural resources and the environment. 
Mattinelli and Almeida (1998) posit that conflicts are "disagreements, public 
complaints, and protests involving arguments, physical assault, violence and 
lawsuits. Feelings of unfairness and injustice, suspicion, anger, emotion, and 
mistrust lead to conflict" (p. 3). Conflict diamonds (UN 2000 & Amnesty Inter-
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national 2007), conflict minerals (DiJohn 2002), and natural resource conflict 
(Collier 2004) are some of the phrases often used to describe conflicts caused by 
natural resources. The resource war may be domestic as is the case of Nigeria 
and Niger Delta community, or North and South Sudan when they were one na-
tion. It may be international as was the case between Iraq and Kuwait which led 
to the first Gulf war or Sudan and Republic of South Sudan, as presently being 
played out. At the center of the conflict between Sudan and the Republic of 
South Sudan (RSS) is Abyei. Since it is between two sovereign states, it is an 
international dispute. Abyei is a border region and therefore, it is also a dispute 
over territory. What does a territory mean in political science? Ubi (20 l 0) attrib-
utes territory to sovereignty and believes that territory is a basic characteristic of 
the state. This implies that each state, in this case Sudan or the RSS, has certain 
territories or jurisdiction for which its laws are supreme over people and institu-
tions within such geographical units. The two states here are trying to establish 
their jurisdictions over a geographical area known as Abyei. But two countries 
cannot exercise jurisdiction over one region at the same time. A state that has no 
territory cannot be treated as a legal entity (Shaw 1999). For example, during the 
dark years of colonialism, most of the colonial regions had no clearly delineated 
territories and therefore were not seen as legal entities. The colonial authorities 
were the entities representing the colonies in treaties and agreements. An exam-
ple is the 181 3 Treaty between Britain and Germany over areas that today are 
called Nigeria and Cameroun. These were negotiated and signed by UK and 
Germany not Nigeria and Cameroun. The colonized areas were either called col-
onies, trusteeships, or protected areas. 
Legal documents and other agreements signed then were in the names of 
colonial authorities. The Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 was not between Nigeria 
and Kamerun but between Germany and Britain. It is not uncommon then for a 
disagreement or conflict to arise over a territory. Huth (1996) posits that "territo-
rial dispute involves either a disagreement between states over where their com-
mon homeland or colonial borders should be fixed . Or, more fundamentally, the 
dispute entails one country the right of another country even to exercise sover-
eignty over some of or all its homeland or colonial territory" (p. 20). Starr and 
Thomas (2005) list two main purposes a territory serves: (i) the creation of spa-
tial arrangement and (ii) the provision of group identity and symbol (p. 125). 
The spatial arrangement of units helps to indicate where the physical or geo-
graphic distance between the units are to be found. For example, the Abyei 
Boundary Commission (ABC) report in 2005 defines the exact territories of the 
northern limit of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms as latitude 10.10' N, from lon-
gitude 27.50 ' E to longitude 29.00' E. The group identity and symbol relates to 
where the people live and what the area means to them. An example of such 
symbolism can be the Ghandi 's salt match in India. In Africa, land is a symbol of 
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an ethnic group's origin, life, and survival. Abdalla (2010) supports this symbolic 
argument by positing that "the Dinka Ngok harbor exceptionally strong senti-
mental attachments to Abyei, which has formed and consolidated their identities 
for generations" (p. 2.) Sticky as it is, the Abyei region is a disagreement be-
tween the two nations over where their border lines should be. So divided were 
the two states on where their territorial limits should be that they had to resmt to 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to decide or resolve the territorial 
dispute for them. Abdalla (20 1 0) observed that the PCA decision on the dispute 
resulted in the loss of pastoral water points and blockage of stock routes. 
Several articles (Collier 2000 & 2004, and Humphrey 2005) have been writ-
ten on natural resources and conflicts in Africa, Asia, and other regions of the 
world. While Collier (2000) powerfully establishes the link between natural re-
sources and civil war, others including Amoah (2004) and Le Bill on (200 I) make 
cases for natural resources as one of the architects of territorial wars . It should be 
noted that the original conflict between Germany and Britain over Bakassi and its 
adjoining regions was over fishery and commercial shipping rights. Nigeria and 
Cameroun inherited this dispute, but soon added conflict over such other natural 
resources as agriculture, oil deposits, and sea routes . 
Types of Territorial or Border Disputes 
The Nature Gallery Geography identifies four types of boundary disputes as: 
positional, territorial, resource, and cultural disputes. The positional dispute deals 
with disagreement over the location of the border lines. This may be as a result of 
historical or surveyor and survey inadequacies. The Nigeria/Cameroun dispute 
over Bakassi, Sudan and RSS over Abyei , Chile and Argentina over the Beagle 
Island attest to positional disputes. Territorial dispute arises when one country 
lays claim to some pa1ts of another sovereign nation. The annexation of Kuwait 
in 1990 by Iraq leading to the first Gulf war is an example of this. Historical and 
cultural factors drive this type of dispute. The conflict between the Kingdom of 
Morocco and Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic stands as a model here. The 
Bakassi Peninsular is another example. Resource conflict occurs as a result of the 
scarcity of natural resources and their abundance in proxy areas. Though nations 
do not directly acknowledge that their disputes are caused by insufficient or lack 
of resources, observers are aware that pressure on nations resulting from over-
population and dwindling resources can generate disputes . There is also the cul-
tural element of border dispute. Borders tend to separate or al ienate groups or 
their members; they separate groups as a result of ethnic distinctiveness, religious 
difference, and ideological affiliation. The Nigerian civil war is an example and 
so is the division of Northern Island between Catholics and Protestants. It is in-
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formative to note that a border dispute may arise because of the combination of 
some or all of the above factors . 
The Case of Bakassi 
The dispute over Bakassi predates the independence of the Cameroun and Nige-
ria. The European contending colonial powers, Germany and Britain, had con-
flicts over fish ing rights and commercial sea routes. Sango (2002) describes the 
dispute over Bakassi as "a legacy of imperialist colonial rule and neo-colonial 
regimes in Africa" (p. 3). The balkanization of Africa that started in Berlin in 
1884 set the stage for the crisis that trailed the Nigeria-Cameroun relationship. 
What was already a confused border situation was further compounded by the 
presence of natural resources in an area that was in dispute. Collier had earlier 
informed us about the six ways natural resources fuel conflicts. Suffice it to say 
that the rent expected from oil and fishing in the Bakassi region made the two 
nations to engage in the following conflict behaviors: they expressed their griev-
ances through the media, framing each other, and refusing at certain times to talk 
to one another. They moved to a level where open clashes or violent confronta-
tions occurred between state and non-state actors leading, to the death of about 
60 people. Negotiations have also taken place including but not limited to the 
controversial agreement between late President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon 
and former Nigerian military leader, General Yakubu Gowan in 1971. The fail-
ure of these measures resulted in the litigation that played out at the International 
Court of Justice. The outcome was a zero-sum that favored one party and left the 
other dissatisfied. 
The conflict between Nigeria and Cameroun over Bakassi stemmed from the 
colonial greed that was passed on to the two countries. The Gennans that colo-
nized Cameroun before World War I (WWI) were interested in shrimps (fishery) 
and Britain that ruled Nigeria was interested in uninterrupted and secure sea lane 
(strategic natural resource) access to Calabar (Omoigui 2006). The opposing 
needs or interests of the colonialists led to the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty. Other 
treaties were signed between France which took over parts of Cameroun follow-
ing the defeat of Germany in WW 1 and Britain that ruled part of Southern Came-
roun and Nigeria. Dzurek (1999) notes that a Nigerian ethnic group inhabits the 
peninsula. Dzurek' s view is supported by Konings (2005) who says that the Ig-
bos of eastern N igeria dominated the Bakassi region and other eastern part of 
Nigeria. The truth remains that Bakassi was not inhabited by only one ethnic 
group in Nigeria. The lbibio, Efik, and Ijaw are among the many other Nigerian 
ethnic groups that live in the area. 
The Obong of Ca1abar' s Treaty of Protection with Britain in 1884 which 
among other things served the interests of the United Kingdom prohibits the par-
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amount ruler from signing any Treaty with another European power without the 
United Kingdom ' s approval. The Colonial government' s manipulations became 
evident in the signing of the 1913 treaty with Germany in which neither approval 
nor consent of Calabar, Nigeria, the owners of the maritime zone, were sought 
(Omoigui 2006 & Anyu 2007). To the two Europeans, it was a demonstration of 
their ability to resolve conflicts between them without litigation, fighting, or arbi-
tration. The first resource conflict (fishing rights and commercial sea route) of 
Bakassi was thus resolved by those that created them through the 1913 Treaty. 
The defeat of Germany in the WWI guaranteed that France and United Kingdom 
shared African territories that were under Gennan occupation. The Gennan 
nmthern Kamerun subsequently became a United Nations (UN) trust region un-
der the French mandate. Its French name, which it still answers today, became 
Cameroun. The southern Cameroun became a British mandate under the UN 
trusteeship and was known as Cameroon. Subsequent agreements were made by 
Britain and France. The colonial aggression against the Africans by the European 
powers was glorified as conquest. Anyu (2007) agrees by postulating that "the 
deep scars that these conflicts leave on people and nations are often obscured by 
historical accounts that, more often than not, glorify conquest and ignore aggres-
sion" (p. 44). The peninsula was not much a subject of territorial and economic 
disputes among the Africans during the colonial period as they lived peacefully 
together but a common ground to join forces to confront their common domina-
tors (the colonialists). 
The second resource conflict similar to the British-Gennan conflicts of late 
1800s stem from the secessionists threat faced by the Gowon administration in 
the Eastern Nigeria and similar but less violent threat to the Ahidjo Administra-
tion in the Southern Cameroun. The Gowon regime moved to block a strategic 
natural military resource base of the secessionist group in eastern Nigeria by 
signing a protocol agreement with the Ahidjo regime. The term "protocol agree-
ment" implies here a memorandum of understanding paving way for future nego-
tiations to settle any gray area in the region. The Gowon' s movement cannot be 
said to be different from what Britain did with Germany in 1913 when commer-
cial interest pushed it to sign off partial sovereignty to Germany. A testament to 
that is the fact that the Yaounde government did not establish an administration 
in the area even after the Nigerian civil war had ended. This administrative gap in 
the peninsula was filled by the Nigerian government which established an admin-
istrative unit in the region. 
The growing population of both Nigeria and Cameroon after independence 
coupled with the pressure put on existing resources increased pressure on the 
peninsula. The governments on both sides, looking to expand the ir revenue bases 
which depended heavily on a primary economic resource, found a willing horse 
in the pronouncement made by European multinationals about the discovery of 
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oil in the region. Collier (2004) hinges the economic roots of civil war in Africa 
to, among other things, the higher ratio of land to population and dependence on 
natural resources when other developing regions are moving into manufacturing. 
The multinational corporations that spearheaded the natural resource exploration 
have been known to be more interested in profits than stabilizing or developing 
the African nations . So, if destabilization will guarantee the flow of profits into 
their pockets, they are ready to sponsor such moves (see Agir Ici-Survie 1999, on 
the role of USA and French governments in the Chad crises). 
Cameroun ' s dec ision to take the case to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) is suspected of having tacit approval from France so that French oil compa-
nies can have unfettered access to the crude oil deposits found in Bakassi . The 
French tacit support of Cameroon is further echoed in an alleged statement by 
France that it will support Cameroon militarily against any conflict with Nigeria 
because of existing military alliance between it and its former colony. Another 
aspect of the rumor is the secret diplomatic meetings between France and Britain 
to collaborate and mobilize other European Union Blocs at the ICJ to rule against 
Nigeria. 
The outcome of the conflict as finally delivered by the ICJ in 2002 was the 
transfer of sovereignty of the peninsula over to Cameroun. The Nigerian people 
especially the Bakassians never accepted that verdict but they have to live with it 
as the decision is final and not appealable. An opportunity to invite inputs from 
the inhabitants of the area through a referendum was missed by the JCJ and the 
UN. This is contrary to the much taunted "Right of Self-Determination" as pro-
vided by Pm11 Article! ofthe UN and further strengthened by Resolution 61/295 
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. One of the outcomes is a win 
to one party and a loss to the other. Has that stopped violence or threat of war in 
that area? I would say that at the moment, the two nations are technically not at 
war but the non-state actors from both sides are at war. 
Why Do Natural Resources Cause Conflicts in Bakassi and Abyei? 
Collier (2004) provides a one-shot answer when he links the fueling of conflict 
with rent which natural resources generate in excess. His argument is further 
supp011ed by the six routes by which natural resource rents increase the risk of 
violent conflict. The routes include the contest for control of resource revenue; 
detachment of government from the electorates; location of natural resources 
(natural resources are usually found in peripheral parts of the country); source of 
finance for rebel groups (MEND in Nigeria and military wing of SPLM in Su-
dan); appreciation of the real exchange rate (other sectors of the economy are 
neglected); and unstable nature of natural resource price in the market (the price 
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of natural resources are usually volatile, so that the economy becomes subject to 
booms and busts) (p.4). 
Commonalities of Abyei and Bakassi Conflicts 
History has a way of linking events, communities, and nations together. Colonial-
ism as a part of African historical identity placed Bakassi and Abyei together. 
Burton (1991); Zonkosi (2004); and Tanagho and Hermina (2009) have all stated 
how Abyei was ruled by Britain at a certain stage of its existence. Similarly, 
Mbuh (2004) and Omoigui (2006) point to the time Bakassi peninsula was under 
British rule. It is not surprising therefore that these two regions have similar his-
tory of being former colonies of the United Kingdom. They shared another Brit-
ish legacy of boundary disputes. 
The conflicts in the two regions are the combinations of territorial , positional, 
resource, and cultural factors. The parties to the conflicts (in Nigeria vs. Came-
roon over Bakassi, and Sudan vs. RSS over Abyei) disagree over where the 
boundary lines should be in their respective disputed areas. There are also the 
issues of culture which place certain attachments on the groups that claim the 
given disputed areas. One of such claims is the claim of Ngok Dinka that Abyei 
is a symbol of many of their ancestors who lived in the land. 
The Abyei region and its ethnic group composition were said to have been 
placed at different administrative areas during Sudan's colonial past under the 
United Kingdom. As aptly observed by the International Crisis Group (2007) 
"they lived within separate administrative boundaries in colonial days, until 
1905" (p. 2). Bakassi was at various times under the administrative control of 
Germany, England, France, Cameroun, and Nigeria. 
Another commonality is the presence of oil deposits which is one of the rea-
sons that turned the region into a beautiful bride that is courted by not only the 
two neighboring countries but also by China and other international oil specula-
tors . Oil has served as the magnet that attracts the mult inational corporations 
(MNCs) and their home governments. It is a resource that generates rent accord-
ing to Collier and the rent is higher than is required to explore the resource de-
posit. The governments of Sudan and the RSS are eagerly waiting their chance to 
control the expected revenue from the oil deposits in Abyei . 
Another commonality for them which may not be a mutual benefit is the 
need to share refineries or oil processing facilities through joint ownership or 
management. Experience has shown that in the event of future crises between the 
two countries, the oil facilities will be the first target for economic and political 
strategies. The threat to and actual cut off of supplies or increased tariffs often 
seen or heard in Russia's relationship with some of its fo rmer ideological part-
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ners in eastern Europe may serve as examples. Similarly, oil refineries are in the 
northern Sudan while the crude oil deposits are in the South especially in Abyei. 
Lessons Abyei Disputants Can Learn from Bakassi? 
The first lesson Abyei, Sudan, and the Republic of South Sudan should take from 
the Bakassi conflict is not to allow external agencies to partition their borders. 
The judges of the ICJ , PCA, and other institutions that arbitrate or adjudicate 
border disputes rarely set their feet on the plains of the disputed territories. They 
cannot therefore be more knowledgeable than the people that own the land. Most 
of their decisions have never been acceptable to the so called "big powers" who 
think that the institutions are not competent enough to decide on cases involving 
their interests. The Guantanamo Bay dispute between the United States and Cuba 
and the Gibraltar area between Spain and Morocco provide us with some exam-
ples. It has been argued that a government that guarantees the protection of the 
interests of the power players in the international scene will always receive their 
backings at the ICJ and other related bodies. China would continue to use its veto 
power at the UN to thwart any move that threatens President Omar al-Bashir's 
position as long as he remains China's reliable partner. Whenever it becomes 
necessary for China' s national interest, China will trade its veto power and sup-
port for Sudan with other super powers. 
Also, even where the judges are knowledgeable, the positions of their home 
countries ' governments and the interests of the MNCs weigh much on the direc-
tion of decisions, especially when the external powers are not very sure of the 
intensions of would-be successors or their puppet regimes. Moreover, Abyei 
should understand that the probability is high of the Court delivering rulings in 
favor of the side/country that guarantees the interests of the western world . An 
example is the foot dragging by the super powers in the Syrian crisis. 
Further, the people or human elements at the center of the Bakassi conflict 
have been dislodged, dislocated, and dismembered from their source of liveli-
hood, place of residence, and cultural group or nationality. The Anangs, Efiks, 
lbibios and others on the Nigerian side now have to be called citizens of another 
country. This is not new; since the Berlin Conference, African ethnic groups have 
been so divided among various nations. The difference is that the transfer was 
being effected by the j udicial decision in 2002, about 116 years after Berlin . As a 
result, the people ' s fi shing occupation is at a crossroad because of the transfer to 
a Camerounian government, law, and customs-with the accompanying xeno-
phobia. Their counterparts in Cameroun have to go through the process of ac-
cepting and competing with additional population and ethnic groups. These hu-
man angles of the conflicts were not considered when the ICJ judges ruled in 
74 Journal of Global Initiatives 
2002. Similarly, any arrangement that may result in the dislodging or dismember-
ing ofthe ethnic groups in Abyei will be a future source of conflict. 
Yet, another lesson to be learned is the case that joint ownership of, or in-
vestment in, petroleum facility by the two countries will not be economically and 
politically viable given the level of mistrust that exists between the two nations. 
The trends have shown that war is likely between the two countries. In the event 
of any exacerbation of the conflict, one side may cut off the supply or refining of 
petroleum products to the other nation. This joint ownership has also some impli-
cations in terms of the development of the area. No government on either side of 
the partnership will be willing to invest much on the disputed area fearing that 
one day, it may finally be overrun by the other and their investments will be lost. 
Interestingly, before the advent of colonialism in the Bakassi area, the known 
paramount ruler, the Obong of Calabar, his council, and subjects have traditional 
peaceful resolution of conflicts mechanisms that enabled them to live in peace. 
Two of those mechanisms are the narrative mediation and negotiation. The par-
ties to the conflicts would narrate what brought the conflict and any claims each 
makes must have a narration that links him or her to the issue at stake. A council 
of elders or spiritual leaders and other related agencies wil l listen to these narra-
tions and come up with an unbiased mediated agreement that all will be happy 
with. A similar system existed in pre-1905 Abyei which may be revived and 
modernized to promote peace among the indigenes . 
Finally, Abyei should learn from Bakassi that war does not provide a durable 
or sustainable solution to border disputes but has brought destruction of life and 
property. The resources for which the nations go to war are also either destroyed 
in the process or are immediately impossible to exploit. 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Having established some commonalities between the Abyei and Bakassi conflicts 
and based on the lessons learned from the bad measures taken to resolve the Ba-
kassi conflicts, this paper recommends several solutions: 
The traditional peace building and peace making that worked for the Abyei 
people prior to 1905 should be explored, modified, and adopted rather than re-
sorting to international arbitration and litigation. There are advantages to be de-
rived from this approach. It is cost effective and relationships are maintained. 
Elders of the ethnic groups are more knowledgeable about the things that hold 
them together. They know where the boundaries of each group start and end. 
They also know how to multiply the pies (resources) such that each party wins or 
benefits from the available resources as well as contributing to their replacement. 
The judges and interests that preside at the PCA, ICJ, and other related arbitra-
tion institutions do not know or often ignore this rich African peacebuilding tra-
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dition. Abdalla (20 1 0) points to the action of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) which redrew the border areas of Abyei and the dissatisfaction of the dis-
putants as one of the flaws of litigations in border disputes. In the pre-1905 tradi-
tional system, the major ethnic groups by the end of every season came together 
and decided on compensations and damages that may have resulted from their 
joint economic activities in the area. The process served the community very well 
then because each party went home satisfied with what they got and also main-
tained their peaceful co-existence. The patties derived satisfaction from the fact 
that they resolved their conflicts themselves. The pride of ownership of the peace 
efforts motivates disputants to fend of adversarial externalities. 
Secondly, the two nations should build upon their traditional conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms by negotiating a compensation package that is payable and ac-
ceptable to both parties in order to transfer complete ownership of economically 
productive resources such as refineries to whichever state that eventually wins 
sovereignty over Abyei. This recommendation serves two purposes. The first one 
is to ensure that the problem of cutting off supply or production is averted in the 
event of unforeseen conflicts between them. The second is to ensure that the 
region is properly developed and any failure to develop it can be blamed on the 
country where it is located rather than holding the two entities jointly responsi-
ble. 
Finally, th is paper recommends that the MNCs and their home governments 
should work with the African governments in their efforts to solve their problems 
in the African way. It is suggested here that many of African conflicts would not 
have escalated to the level that they were, were it not for external influence ofthe 
West and, presently, China. This is not advocating for Africa to isolate itself from 
the rest of the world. Rather, the continent should look inward for home-grown 
conflict management mechanisms. The interventions of the International Court of 
Justice, Permanent Court of Arbitration and other supranational organizations 
have always brought no permanent and sustainable peace. Their effectiveness has 
been apparent mainly in the protection of Western interests. 
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